








Infinite numbers are large finite numbers
Jeremy Gwiazda

Abstract: In this paper, I suggest that infinite numbers are large finite numbers, and that infinite numbers, properly understood, are 1) of the structure  + (* + )Ө + *, and 2) the part is smaller than the whole. I present an explanation of these claims in terms of epistemic limitations. I then consider the importance, part of which is demonstrating the contradiction that lies at the heart of Cantorian set theory: the natural numbers are too large to be counted by any finite number, but too small to be counted by any infinite number – there is no number of natural numbers.





	The above quote is from Bertrand Russell. To our modern Cantorian ears, it immediately gives rise to a certain tension. On the one hand, the quote seems like nonsense; one the other hand, Russell is widely agreed to be a great philosopher (and one who had rigorous mathematical training). One goal of this paper is to understand Russell’s quote. Even thought of in this narrow, historical manner, this is no trivial goal, as similar passages can be found in the writings of many past giants of philosophy and mathematics, such as Leibniz and Frege, to name just two. I discuss a number of these passages below. If we want to understand these passages, we would do well to come to terms with Russell’s quote, and not dismiss it as simple confusion. However, a second goal of this paper is more ambitious. I believe that Russell is correct, that is, that there is no number of natural numbers (for precisely the reason that Russell outlined in the quote). The second goal of this paper is to suggest that there is no number of natural numbers, because the natural numbers are too large to be counted by a finite number, but too small to be counted by an infinite number. Note that Russell writes, ‘For if there are n numbers, the last number must be n.’ Obviously Russell is working with a conception of number that is non-Cantorian (to even speak of a ‘last number’ requires order, yet Cantor’s infinite ordinals do not need to have last numbers, or elements, e.g.,  has no last element). 
Let us, then, begin with the question: Which objects are the infinite numbers? Many people today do not understand the significance of this question. They assume that Cantor settled the matter well over 100 years ago. Or they feel that there are many different kinds of number (negative, rational, real, complex, p-adic, etc.) and that these various numbers are all, somehow, equally good. But the second reply misses the point that the natural numbers are fundamental in a very basic sense, numbers like 2, 7, and 103. The question is: How do we extend these numbers, the natural numbers, into the infinite? And the first reply is an assumption, and in this paper, I ultimately argue that Cantor did not undertake this extension properly; the assumption that Cantor answered the question correctly is false.​[2]​ Put differently, Cantor’s infinite ordinals are not the infinite numbers. I argue that infinite numbers are large finite numbers and are of the form  + (* + )Ө + *.​[3]​ I am going to begin by telling two stories about infinite number. These are stories that few, in our present Cantorian age, will initially believe. Yet they are also stories that, I suggest, are both true and important. In the first story, I present an answer to the question: Which objects are the infinite numbers? I answer this question by assuming that infinite numbers are like finite numbers in certain ways (to be discussed) and, based on these assumptions, I investigate the resulting structure of the infinite numbers. In the second story, the structures that were found in the first story are again found, but this time via a different path. I suggest that the best explanation (for the same structures arising via the two different paths) is that infinite numbers are large finite numbers. After the two stories in section 2, I go on to examine the importance of this conception of the infinite numbers.

2.1 Infinite numbers story 1: informal transfer

	Which objects are the infinite numbers? If the goal is to arrive at infinite numbers that differ as little as possible from finite (natural) numbers, what would such numbers look like? Let us arrive at the infinite numbers by moving (some) properties that all finite numbers share into the infinite. Above I wrote that ‘we seek the infinite version of such numbers as 2, 7, and 103’. We can think of such numbers as being composed of ordered elements, or strokes, in base 1, that is:

7 is | | | | | | | 

Note that I will use ‘elements’ to refer to the units (strokes) that comprise the number. Then any such finite number has a last element, every element but the first has a predecessor, every element but the last has a successor, every number is odd or even, and subtracting 1 from a number yields a different and smaller number. Let us move these properties​[4]​ into the infinite, where we begin by simply assuming that an infinite number, M, exists. Then when we subtract 1 from M, we arrive at a smaller infinite number. We can continue subtracting units from M, M-1, etc., and so the picture that emerges is:

1, 2, 3…      …M-2, M-1, M

which is of order-type  + *. Next, numbers are either odd or even. Let us choose an infinite M that is even. Then M/2 is an infinite number, and so it cannot be in the  or the * copy thus far,​[5]​ and so the picture is:

1, 2, 3…      M/2      … M-2, M-1, M

We can subtract and add units to M/2, resulting in:

1, 2, 3…            …M/2 - 2, M/2 - 1, M/2, M/2 + 1, M/2 + 2…      … M-2, M-1, M

Our number now is of structure  + (* + ) + *. And we can continue in this vein, assuming that M is divisible by 4, thus arriving at M/4 and 3M/4. Each of M/4 and 3M/4 gives rise to a copy of (* + ), as again we can add and subtract units from each. The structure that emerges is:  + (* + )Ө + *. Let us postpone a discussion of the order-type of Ө. By an informal transfer of properties of finite numbers into the infinite, we have arrived at infinite numbers of structure  + (* + )Ө + *. Perhaps these are the infinite numbers.​[6]​

2.2 Infinite numbers story 2: large finite number

‘The point of view that there are no non-experienced truths … has found acceptance with regard to mathematics much later than with regard to practical life and to science.’​[7]​ L.E.J. Brouwer

	In this section we will see the structure arrived at in section 2.1,  + (*+)Ө + *, arise from a very different route. Let us consider another story. The aliens come to earth, landing in the salt flats of Utah. They leave behind a steel bar that is 20 miles long, 2 inches tall, and 1/4 inch thick. It is not immediately apparent that there is anything on the bar. However, with the use of the most powerful microscope on earth, scientists are able to see 1 inch strokes wherever they look on one face of the bar. Thinking that the bar might contain a very important message of some sort or other, Congress makes it a priority to investigate the entire bar, earmarking 2 billion dollars for the project, and appointing you to lead the effort. Now, of course, you have no idea what is on the bar, but I will tell you what is on the bar. The bar contains nothing except for 805000 strokes. These strokes can only be distinguished by using the microscope.
	Your first step is to order more microscopes to be built, so that several teams can investigate the bar at the same time. The microscopes can be turned out at the rate of 1 every week or so. Given that you have 1 microscope, you decide to start at the beginning, or the leftmost end of the bar. You send a team with the microscope to start investigating the bar. They start at the leftmost stroke, and investigate. The microscopes are able to mark each stroke that has been investigated. Each night, the team stops work, first reporting what they have found to you. Now, given that more teams are soon to investigate the bar, you decide you need a code to keep track of what the teams have found. You decide upon the following:

	will indicate that a team has found a group of strokes, and that they have space (more bar) to investigate to the right of the group they have investigated, but no space to the left.

*  will indicate that a team has found a group of strokes, and that they have space 
      (more bar) to investigate to the left of the group they have investigated, but no 
      space to the right.

(*+)   will indicate that a team has found a group of strokes, and that they have space
     (more bar) to investigate to the left and to the right of the group they have
      investigated.

	You also use a number to indicate how many strokes they have found. Of course, as you have no idea what is on the bar, you certainly entertain the possibility that you may need more symbols if anything other than a stroke appears (which we know won’t happen). Thus, at the end of the first day, perhaps the team starting at the left of the bar has seen 50 strokes (working with the microscope is slow going). Thus, you jot down in your notebook “50 ” (let’s imagine that a team investigates 50 strokes per day). Let us further imagine that when the 2nd microscope is ready, you assign a new team to investigate the bar starting at the rightmost edge. And so of course they investigate right to left. At the end of team 2’s first day (which is the 8th day for team 1), when the teams have reported in, you jot down in your notebook “400  + 50 *”. The ‘+’ is just a symbol used to keep the teams’ reports separate. Again, the meaning of your notation “400  + 50 *” is that Team 1 has found 400 strokes, and has space on the bar to investigate to the right, but not to the left. Team 2 has found 50 strokes and has space on the bar to investigate to the left, but not to the right. Teams 1 and 2 plod on their weary way, when microscope 3 becomes ready. You send Team 3 roughly to the middle of the bar (10 miles from each end) and tell them to go to it. Team 3 will have space to investigate on both sides. Thus, at the end of day 15, your notebook would read “750  + 50(*+) +  400 *”. 
	From this point on, the structure of the bar (your jotting each night, ignoring numbers) is  + (*+)Ө + *.  In this case Ө must be finite. A picture of this situation after 5 microscopes are in use is the following:

   												

                              (*+)                 (*+)                         (*+)	          *

	We might also put this point this way. Numbers are multiplicities composed of units. So, for example, 6 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. Now imagine some large number, perhaps 805000, written in this form. Then, investigating this number in the left, right, and middle of its representation would result in the following:

M = 805000 = 1 + 1 + 1 …     …+ 1 + 1 + 1…       …+ 1 + 1 + 1…       …+ 1 + 1 + 1

	We again see the structure  + (* + )Ө + * result. (This investigation is almost identical to the alien bar investigation, except that now there are ‘+’ symbols between the units/strokes.)
In sections 2.1 and 2.2 of this paper, we have arrived at the same structure, but via very different routes. In section 2.1, an informal investigation into infinite number, one that very closely paralleled the discussion of the structure of nonstandard infinite numbers in a nonstandard model of arithmetic, arrived at the structure  + (* + )Ө + *. (But note that this investigation had nothing to do with model theory; we simply moved properties shared by all finite numbers into the infinite.) In section 2.2, groups investigating a number of strokes that was too large for them to investigate fully also arrived at this same structure. One explanation for this ‘coincidence’, and the explanation I believe, is that the structure of infinite numbers is, in fact,  + (* + )Ө + *, and that these infinite numbers are large finite numbers. 
	Let us now answer a question that I have postponed: If the idea in section 2.1 was to arrive at infinite numbers that had as many properties as finite numbers as possible, then why aren’t the infinite numbers well-ordered? The answer is that the infinite numbers are not well-ordered because, in some cases, it is not possible to get from the maximal element (or other, middle elements) to the first element of a large finite number.​[8]​




‘Why do I make so much of what is, after all, a matter of terminology? Because in really fundamental matters an injudicious choice of terminology can lead to confusion of thought: if we do not call things by their proper names we may not give them their proper due.’ ​[10]​ J.P. Mayberry





What we think the (infinite) numbers are affects our reasoning. As one example, consider this story. Immortal Ike was born, has lived an infinite number of days, and is still alive today. Let us hold off on the question as to whether or not this story is logically possible (I think it is). Here, I simply want to point out that if possible, the structure that describes Ike’s days, from birthday to today, is as above, namely:  + (* + )Ө + *.​[12]​ William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith miss this point, because they cannot escape their Cantorian outlook. When considering the possibility that the universe may contain days (events) separated by an infinite time, both Smith and Craig discuss​[13]​ the order-type * +  *, which looks like:  

… | | | | d          …| | | | | | 

For example, Craig writes, ‘if the series of past events is actually infinite, then the events in the series can be ordinally numbered  + , or more correctly * +  *….’​[14]​ But * +  * is not the correct order-type to model such a situation. I have changed one stroke into a ‘d’ to highlight the problem, which Craig himself noted, ‘when … day [d] was present, what day was then ‘tomorrow’? There was no such day, which is absurd.’​[15]​ Of course this is absurd. But the absurdity comes from Craig’s forcing his thinking into traditional Cantorian patterns. Once we recognize that infinite (discrete) time (or space) with beginning and end must be of the form  + (* + )Ө + *, if it is logically possible at all, then there is no absurdity from a lack of yesterdays or tomorrows.
	Let us consider a historical example from the more distant past. The infinite numbers share many properties with the finite numbers. For example: 1) there is a first element that has a successor, 2) there is a last element that has a predecessor, and 3) there are middle elements that have both successors and predecessors. Many historical figures wanted to retain these properties for the infinite numbers. Once we understand this motivation, certain passages make sense. A clear example is the following passage from Frege:​[16]​

86. In order to obtain his infinite numbers, Cantor introduces the relational concept of following in a sequence, which differs from my “following in a series.” According to him, for instance, a sequence would result if one were to order the finite positive whole numbers so that the odd numbers followed one another in their natural order, similarly the even numbers in theirs, and it were further stipulated that all the even numbers should come after all the odd numbers. In this sequence, e.g., 0 would follow 13. There would, however, be no number immediately preceding 0. Now this case cannot occur within my definition of following in a series. It may be strictly proved, if y follows x in the φ-series, there is an object which immediately precedes y in this series. It seems to me then, that the exact definitions of following in a sequence and of number (in Cantor’s sense) are still lacking. Thus Cantor bases himself on a somewhat mysterious “inner intuition” where a proof from definitions should be striven for and would probably be found. 

	Frege has indicated that elements (he writes ‘objects’) should have predecessors. He gives the example of the odds, followed by the evens, or: 1, 3, 5, 7…      0, 2, 4, 6…. This is  + . It is the smallest ordinal to fail both properties 2 and 3, above – that is, it is the smallest Cantorian ordinal that has a middle element that lacks a predecessor, 0, and that has no last element. Frege chose a good example to motivate his claim that Cantor’s infinite ordinals are not the infinite numbers. I suggest that Frege’s motivation in this passage is to retain properties of finite numbers. Frege is concerned that properties of finite numbers are not carrying over to Cantor’s infinite ordinals. When the infinite numbers are developed in the manner I have suggested, then these properties do carry over to infinite numbers.​[17]​
Leibniz is another figure who writes a great deal about a ‘last number’ or ‘infinitieth term’. See footnote 25 for one example. Then, instead of multiplying Leibniz quotes, I refer the interested reader to Samuel Levey’s excellent article, ‘Leibniz on Mathematics and the Actually Infinite Division of Matter’, where a number of such quotes are presented. Before proceeding, I should note that at one point Leibniz writes, ‘To this reasoning I have nothing else to reply, except that the number of terms is not always the last number of the series.’ In this paper, I argue that the number of terms is always the last number of the series, even for infinite numbers.​[18]​

3.3 Historical Paradoxical Importance

	Again note that we are proceeding on the assumption that infinite numbers are of the form  + (* + )Ө + *, and that therefore any mention of infinite number must be in this form. First let us note a subtle point. It is only the completed, or actual, infinite that must be of this form. As one example, our method cannot dissolve the St. Petersburg paradox, for this involves a potential infinite. That is, it is not the case that infinitely many coin flips ever occur. It is simply the case that for any finite number n, it is possible that more than n coin flips occur. Thus insofar as the St. Petersburg paradox involves the potential (and not actual) infinite,  is legitimately used, and so our method cannot dissolve any paradox that remains in this case.
	However, I suggest that many other paradoxes of the infinite are paradoxes of structure, and are therefore dissolved by noting the correct structure of infinite number. Let us consider several examples, beginning with the spaceship paradox.​[19]​ In this example, a spaceship travels, let us say, one mile in 1/2 hour, one mile in the next 1/4 hour, etc. Where is the spaceship at time one hour? There seems to be no good answer. But note that we are treating  as a completed number, that is, we are stating that a spaceship actually travels one mile infinitely many times. But we are not using the correct structure of infinite number. If a spaceship travels one mile infinitely many times, then the structure of that infinity must be  + (* + )Ө + *. Then, when we ask: Where is the spaceship?, the answer is: M miles away, where M is an infinite number whose structure is  + (* + )Ө + *. And, insofar as an infinite number is a large finite number, it may be the case that the spaceship is, e.g., M = 805000 miles away.
To this point, we have dissolved one paradox of the infinitely large, namely the spaceship paradox. Let us turn to the infinitely small, beginning with Zeno’s paradoxes. Can a runner complete a run of one mile? Zeno argues that the answer is no, for completing a run of one mile would require that the runner complete infinitely many tasks (a run to 1/2 mile, to 3/4, to 7/8…) which is impossible. But this is not an allowable way of breaking up one task into infinitely many parts. Rather, the one task (a run of one mile) must be broken up into M parts (each of infinitesimal length 1/M) of structure  + (* + )Ө + *. Then there is little trouble in completing infinitely many tasks, as there is a last task, namely the Mth. There is also no trouble beginning the run, as there is a first task. We have thus gone some ways towards dissolving two of Zeno’s paradoxes. However, the worry remains, how does the runner ever ‘leave’ the initial -copy? (This worry was discussed insightfully by Michael White.​[20]​) But if infinite numbers are large finite numbers, the problem with ‘leaving the initial -copy’ is a vestige of the fact that the distinction between the finite and the infinite is vague, that is, it is an epistemic issue.​[21]​
	We also can dissolve any mystery that remains with Thomson’s Lamp (many people assume that Benacerraf has already done so, but few recall that Thomson wrote, ‘It does not seem helpful here to canvas such possibilities as that the lamp disintegrates at the crucial moment, or that each time we press the switch it halves in size. Of course such things might happen. But if we want to trace the consequences of the suggestion that such and such an -task has been completed, we do better to ignore them.’​[22]​) Simply put, if we hit a switch an infinite number of times, then we have either hit the switch an even number of times, or an odd number of times, as on the correct conception of infinite number, infinite numbers are either odd or even. We can then determine whether the lamp is on or off.
	I suggest that most paradoxes involving the infinite​[23]​ are paradoxes of structure, that is, not dealing with the correct objects that are the infinite numbers leads directly to the paradoxes. They are dissolved by a proper recognition of the objects that are the infinite numbers (and also a proper recognition of the structure of infinite distance, infinite time, etc.). 

3.4 New Paradoxical Importance

‘Are we, then, to be driven from Cantor’s paradise? The issue comes to this: must we accept that for a plurality to be finite, or, equivalently, to have a size, it must be larger than any of its proper subpluralities; or may we suppose, with Cantor, that the species of natural numbers (however defined) is finite, despite the fact that it can be placed in one-to-one correlation with most of its proper subpluralities? Cantor’s axiom, the so called Axiom of Infinity, does represent a bold extrapolation beyond our ordinary experience. But everyone must concede, pro and anti-Cantorian alike, that there is nothing obviously wrong with it. If it contains a contradiction, then that contradiction has eluded the notice of the best mathematicians for the past one hundred and twenty-five years. Such negative evidence is not, of course, decisive, however impressive it may seem to us. For we may well be inclined to overestimate our collective capacity. Perhaps there is a contradiction buried in Cantor’s ideas which we have simply not had the wit to discover.’​[24]​ J.P. Mayberry

	The contradiction is as follows. Cantor assumes that there is some number of natural numbers. But there is no number of natural numbers, because the natural numbers are too large to be finite, but too small to be infinite. Too see this, let us return to (a more extensive version of) Russell’s quote that began this paper:

The series of [natural] numbers is infinite. This is the common basis of all theories of infinity. But difficulties arise as soon as we examine this statement. For we can hardly say that there is an infinite number of finite numbers. For if there are n numbers, the last number must be n. If n is infinite, the last number is infinite, thus n is not the number of finite numbers. But if n is finite, there must be a finite number (n+1), and therefore again n is not the number of finite numbers.​[25]​

	To understand Russell’s concern, let us consider an infinite number, 805000. Then the structure of this number is:

1, 2, 3…         …805000/2 - 1, 805000/2, 805000/2 + 1,…      … 805000-1, 805000

	Then all the numbers in the leftmost -copy, namely 1, 2, 3…, are finite numbers. All other numbers are infinite numbers, e.g., 805000. Note then that this infinite number counts some infinite numbers, in addition to all of the finite ones, and so is not the number of finite numbers. As Russell writes, ‘For we can hardly say that there is an infinite number of finite numbers. For if there are n numbers, the last number must be n. If n is infinite, the last number is infinite, thus n is not the number of finite numbers.’ Any infinite number counts too many numbers to be the number of finite numbers.
Of course, any finite number fails to count some finite numbers, and so also fails to count the number of finite (that is, natural) numbers. As Russell writes, ‘But if n is finite, there must be a finite number (n+1), and therefore again n is not the number of finite numbers.’ Any finite number counts too few numbers to be the number of finite numbers. When it comes to natural numbers, infinite numbers count too many numbers, finite numbers count too few numbers. There is no number of natural numbers.




In this section, I briefly discuss two topics. First, I suggest that recognizing that there is no number of natural numbers gives us insight into why the continuum hypothesis presents ‘difficulties’. If there is no number of natural numbers, then it is not surprising that questions of the relative size of the natural numbers and other sets are difficult, or even unanswerable, questions.




	The finite (natural) numbers share certain properties. For example, every finite number has a maximal element. I suggest that such properties should carry over to infinite numbers. Simply because each finite number is a finite number, and therefore counts a finite collection, is no reason that the collection of all finite numbers is (or, has) a number – and in this paper, I have argued that it is not.  is not a number, nor can it be counted by any number. To see this, first we must understand the importance of the question: Which objects are the infinite numbers? I have argued that infinite numbers are of the form  + (* + )Ө + * and are large finite numbers. Cantor did not extend numbers into the infinite correctly. He began with the natural numbers, or , and forced a number upon it. Consider Hallett, ‘[Cantor’s theory of number deals only with sets, and he assumes … that “every well-defined set has a definite power”. For this reason his treatment of number is best viewed, not as an attempt to define number, but as an attempt to explain, given a set, what the number belonging to it is like.’​[28]​ Instead, we should begin with the question: Which objects are the infinite numbers? I believe that when this question is answered correctly, it follows that there is no number of natural numbers, as argued above.
	What has been accomplished in this paper? Let me answer this question in two parts, the first a conservative answer, the second more ambitious. First and conservatively, I demonstrated that a number of passages from thinkers throughout history make sense when we understand that they are trying to move properties of finite numbers into the infinite, that is, they are moving these properties to (arrive at) infinite numbers. I presented quotes from Russell, Frege, and Leibniz to this effect. I suggested that by moving properties into the infinite, via the sort of informal transfer principle​[29]​ undertaken in section 2.1, we arrive at infinite numbers of the form  + (* + )Ө + *. Next, I presented an interesting fact, namely, that a large finite number investigated under epistemic limitations gives rise to the structure  + (* + )Ө + *. At the very least, we seem to have run into an interesting coincidence.
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^1	  Russell, pp. 121-122.
^2	  Note too that Cantor divided number into cardinal and ordinal number. Throughout this paper order is involved (taken into consideration) and so those of a Cantorian mindset should think of ordinal number, meaning simply that order is involved. That is, we want to know what the infinite numbers are, taking order into consideration. Ultimately on the Euclidean position I endorse, there is little difference between cardinal and ordinal number – ordinal number simply has a bit more structure. Put another way, there is only one ordinal for each cardinal. On this last point, see Mayberry, p. 291.
^3	  This is, of course, the order-type of numbers less than some nonstandard number in a nonstandard model of arithmetic. My claim is that the order-type of the infinite (nonstandard) numbers (in a nonstandard model of arithmetic) is the order-type of the infinite numbers (full stop). The argument to this conclusion is undertaken in sections 2.1 and 2.2. The argument involves no model theory. That is, I am not ‘confusing nonstandard numbers in a model with the Cantorian infinite’, as one person put it. I am arguing that infinite numbers are of a certain structure, and this argument does not involve model theory.
^4	  It might be asked at this point: How can we assume that these properties hold for infinite numbers? And why don’t we include, for example, well-ordering? The answer: I am going to argue that infinite numbers simply are large finite numbers. If true, obviously these properties will hold of infinite numbers. Well-ordering does not; I suggest why, below.
^5	  M/2 is infinite because if it were finite, then M would be finite, which it is not. We are assuming that finite numbers are closed under addition and multiplication. Exponentiation is not. On this point, see, e.g., Nelson and Parikh – though note that their methods are set-theoretic. Also, M/2 cannot be in the copies thus far, because then the difference between M/2 and M (or M/2 and 1) would be finite, which again, it is not.
^6	  Again, I recognize that this development closely mirrors, or is an informal version of, Robinson, pp. 49-55. But the point is that, even well before Robinson and non-standard models, people wanted infinite numbers to, e.g., have last elements because finite numbers do. And, I suggest that infinite numbers, correctly understood, do have last elements. Also see footnote 3.
^7	  Brouwer, p. 90.
^8	  See Lavine (1995, especially p. 404) for an interesting discussion of the failure of transitivity due to epistemic limitations. Both Lavine (1995) and (1994) are similar to my approach in a number of important respects. Those who argue that each finite number is well-ordered, and therefore so too each infinite number must be well-ordered, seem to miss the obvious point that each finite number is also ‘anti-well-ordered’, that is, every subset has a maximal element. It is a bit unclear as to why those who, following Cantor, argue that well-ordering is the key to moving finite whole numbers into the infinite don’t care one bit for anti-well-ordering. (It is as though Sophie, faced with her choice, said ‘By all means take Eva, I don't care. I only care for Jan.’) The point is that to arrive at the structure of the infinite numbers, we should look to properties that all finite numbers share, not properties that the collection of all finite numbers has. And we cannot arbitrarily drop one property (anti-well-ordering) while keeping another (well-ordering). Both must go. Also, I have already explained why well-ordering fails.
^9	  For Aristotle, for example, a key feature of the infinite is precisely its inexhaustibility. On the position outlined in this paper, a number is infinite so long as it has not been exhausted, and then suddenly finite when it has been exhausted, or investigated fully. But see section 4 for a brief discussion of a move from epistemic limitations to set-theoretic limitations.
^10	  Mayberry, p. 92.
^11	  Hallett p. 60, all parenthetical material in original. Hallett cites Noether and Cavailles (1937, p. 55). Also note an important methodological point: we should move properties that each finite number has into the infinite. We must not simply assume that the collection of all finite numbers is the smallest example of an infinite number, and move properties of it, e.g., well-ordering, into the infinite. See footnote 8 for a further discussion of well-ordering. Also see footnote 2 for the important point that on the Euclidean view (the part is smaller than the whole) which I endorse in this paper, there is no deep distinction between cardinal and ordinal number.
^12	  If infinite number is of the form  + (* + )Ө + *, then it may follow that if space and time are infinite, then they are also of this structure. In the case of continuous space and time,  would be replaced with a ray opening to the right, and * with a ray opening to the left.
^13	  See, e.g., Craig, ‘Time and Infinity’, p. 390; Craig, ‘Reply to Smith: On the Finitude of the Past’, p. 229; and Smith, ‘Reply to Craig: The Possible Infinitude of the Past’, p. 114.
^14	  Craig, ‘Time and Infinity’, p. 390.
^15	  Craig, ‘Reply to Smith: On the Finitude of the Past’, p. 231.
^16	  Frege, p. 153, my emphases.
^17	  That is, I am suggesting that these figures were correct: infinite numbers do have last elements, every element but the first does have a predecessor, etc.
^18	  The Leibniz quote is quoted in Levey (1998, p. 84). That I found Levey’s article excellent, is not, of course, to say that I agree with his Cantorian outlook. Bolzano is another interesting historical figure when it comes to the infinite. He argues that the part is smaller than the whole, as I am arguing. Space does not allow for a detailed consideration of Bolzano, or many other historical figures who could be discussed. See Moore (2001) for a discussion of a number of historical figures, including a brief discussion of Bolzano. See also Mancosu (2009) and Parker, both for historical discussion, as well as a discussion of the consistency of the Euclidean position that the part is smaller than the whole, which is the position I argue for in this paper.
^19	  Clark, p. 219.
^20	  White, pp. 437-9.
^21	  Though see section 4 for a discussion of set-theoretic versus epistemic limitations. We need not be wedded to operationalism, though that is my focus in this paper. This worry with ‘leaving the initial -copy’ is a deep and difficult one, and so I do not pretend to have totally dissolved Zeno’s paradoxes. What is needed is a more detailed explanation as to exactly how this is an ‘epistemic issue’ and how the finite-infinite divide is vague.
^22	  Thomson, p. 134.
^23	  For example, I suggest that it is also obvious how to dissolve, e.g., any paradox involving a Zeno-sphere (there will be an outer wall), the cable-guy paradox (the first and second time periods will each contain the same infinite number of intervals, e.g. 805000/2, and if the cable guy misses the first interval of the first time period, then the 2nd interval is preferable), etc. Note too that this attempted resolution of paradoxes of the infinite bears some similarity to McLaughlin and Miller’s use of Internal Set Theory to attempt to resolve these paradoxes. See McLaughlin and Miller (1992) and McLaughlin (1998).
^24	  Mayberry, pp. 263-4.
^25	  Leibniz (pp. 51-3) makes a similar point, though not with the same concision, writing: ‘The number of finite numbers cannot be infinite … Whence it seems that an infinite number is impossible. It seems that all that needs to be proved is that the number of finite numbers cannot be infinite. If numbers can be assumed as continually exceeding each other by one, the number of such finite numbers cannot be infinite, since in that case the number of numbers is equal to the greatest number, which is supposed to be finite. It must be responded that there is not such thing as the greatest number. But even if they increase otherwise than by ones, nevertheless, provided only that they always increase by finite differences, it is necessary that the number of all numbers always has a finite ratio to the last number; and furthermore, the last number will always be greater than the number of all numbers. Whence it follows that the number of all numbers is not infinite…’ [My emphasis.]
^26	  Note also that this paradox can be developed even if it is not accepted that infinite numbers are large finite numbers based on epistemic limitations. See the next section for a further discussion of this point. The point may also be put this way: the paradox can be spelled out in terms of an infinite number M, in place of 805000.
^27	  See also Parikh and Nelson. Parikh (p. 507) writes: ‘Does the Bernays’ number 67(257^729) actually belong to every set which contains 0 and is closed under the successor function? The conventional answer is yes but we have seen that there is a very large element of phantasy in conventional mathematics which one may accept if one finds it pleasant, but which one could equally sensibly (perhaps more sensibly) reject.’ Nelson (p. 50) suggests that 805000 may be infinite.
^28	  Hallett, p. 127.
^29	  By a ‘transfer principle’, I simply mean that we are transferring properties from the finite to the infinite.
^30	  Let me, in a final note, address three issues/questions that often arise in discussing this topic. 1. What do I think these conclusions mean for mathematical practice? I think it means that those who are interested in working on non-Cantorian mathematics, for example extending the work of, e.g., J.P. Mayberry (2000), should feel confident that their research may prove worthwhile. I would also suggest that, e.g., investigation into such problems as CH, and which axioms might settle CH, is potentially a futile undertaking. But I put forth such thoughts gingerly. 2. To be very clear, I am, of course, suggesting that each of the following is false: There is some number of natural numbers; the Cantorian way of judging size (bijection) is correct; and, Cantor’s infinite ordinals are the correct extension of the finite whole numbers into the infinite. 3. Often the objection is raised: But you are claiming that the infinite numbers are comprised of things (’s and *’s) that are not themselves infinite numbers. Yes, I am. And I also claim that ducks are comprised of things (atoms) which are not themselves ducks. But the objector makes the good point that a proper part of an object that is (or, has) a number need not itself be (or, have) a number. See Mayberry (p. 368 and appendix 1) for further discussion of a closely related point.
